[Mark Lapierre]

Originally Posted by Iksander

Isn't the mere fact that we can 'perceive' (which is a function of consciousness) evidence enough to support that there is a link between consciousness and universal identity? Even though perception is subjective, it still implies a connection - the fact that I can perceive a table means that there is a link between my consciousness and the table; simply because I am perceiving it. It does not mean there is a rope from my head tied to the table, but the concept and impression of the table is shaped entirely within my consciousness.

A link that we can conceive of is not necessarily a real link. I can conceive of a traversable wormhole linking my house to my office, but that doesn't mean it exists.

Originally Posted by Iksander

The interesting thought, now that I think about it, is if identity were fluid (which implies it is capable of universal identity) consensus reality is then less about the agreements you are making with other people on things perceived, and more focused on the agreements you make within yourself on things perceived.

I think I missed where you showed that a fluid identity implies the capability of universal identity. Perhaps I'm also misunderstanding. By fluid, do you mean "changing"? And by "universal identity" do you mean a sole identity which applies to everything within the universe?

Originally Posted by Michael Chui

I believe this is precisely ZHereford's point. This is intention-manifestation at its common pinnacle: that all of reality is a manifestation of a singular consciousness as universe. The implicit self-reflection, the paradox, of that is one of the more enjoyable bits.

If there is no external reality, then there is a very strong case for One and a very strong argument against Many.

That's what it reduces to. Iskander's certainty that there is something to our ability to conceptualise connections and communication between micro and macro. His and ZHereford's ponderings on what constitutes existence.

It conflates (I learnt a new word recently, Michael ) concepts with existential reality, without a convincing argument for that merging. Iskander, I agree with your previous statement, that the "existence of a thing is not dependent upon the consensus perception of the thing." If conception made things real we would be up to our necks in unicorns and ponies. And every young boy would be a superhero.

So I think the only thing that is dependent on consensus is common understanding of a thing, as shown by Iskander's example of agreement regarding the colour green. But still, "green" does not exist in reality but only in the perceptions of those who look at it.

I suppose the natural question to ask, and where the discussion seems to have headed, is that if "green" possesses only a conceptual existence, does the object itself also only possess a conceptual existence?

I'll give a couple of examples which I hope show that reality is not dependent on perception, that perception is individualised, and that conceptual reality is none-the-less equivalent to objective reality for the individual, but that equivalence doesn't imply a causative relationship of conceptualisation towards reality.

Consider an object which most people see as red and green. If a group of red/green colourblind people saw that object, they would probably all agree that it's one colour. The object's colour doesn't change, as spectral analysis could confirm, as could a viewing of the object by someone who isn't colourblind.

Next, consider an object of one colour which has a name that not everyone would be familiar with. Walk 100 people past it and they'd probably give it a few different names. Chartreuse, chartreuse green, bright green, fluorescent green, yellow-green. All to describe the one colour. The different labels reflect a few aspects of perception; that it's influenced by familiarity (if you need to name the colour less frequently you'll probably name it using a combination of more familiar names), by association with other concepts (you might recall the French liqueur it was named after), and by knowledge (you were taught that that particular colour had that particular name).

This is why I'm unconvinced by intention-manifestation, because perceptions are malleable to an amazing degree, even within the bounds of natural human existence. It seems clear that we don't (and perhaps can't) really know the true nature of reality, but I'm yet to see a convincing argument for the lack of an external reality (which One vs. Many hinges on).