Iskander: I don't think the computer-brain analogy should be discarded just yet. It may help illustrate the concept of universal identity through a comparison between a single computer, and the Internet. Is the Internet an individual? Is the computer an individual? I would say yes, depending on scale. And as computers communicate with each other in a way which creates the Internet, so do we create societies by communicating with each other.
ShiningLight's body/cell analogy is equally supportive of the argument for individuality. We, as cells, are individually identifiable, but we, as components of networks of people, are collectively identifiable as one unit, depending on how you define the network (friends, family, nation, society, etc).
But if the point was to consider how the cells would see the whole, they have a limited perspective and would need to expand that perspective in order to form any conclusions which reflect reality. I would hope that the cells would consider their limited understanding and factor it into their speculations before coming to any conclusions. They could do this by collecting information about the various types of cells throughout the body, defining the limits of the body, observing what lies beyond those limits, observing the various kinds of activity within and between the various bodily systems, determining ways of interpreting that activity and how it influences the entire body, and it's various parts.
The point of communication between cells, and of possible communication between entities at a larger scale, highlights the need for defining context when considering questions of identity. At a cellular level the body appears to be a vast collection of individuals (and in that context communication is in the form of electrical and chemical signals), yet at the level of everyday existence it appears to be a single unit (with communication in the form of words, gestures, etc.), and out at the level of galaxies it disappears (and who knows what communication goes on, if any. Is gravity a form of communication?).
We operate at the level of everyday existence, obviously. Within that context we are individuals. We may be part of something greater which itself is an individual, and that individual may be part of a collective of such individuals, and so on. And going in the other direction, aren't quarks individuals?
Ultimately I don't think these are questions we can answered definitively through logic alone (and certainly not through speculation). Secondly, due to the subjective nature of personal experience, it also can't answer the questions in a way which is relevant to anyone but the one who had the experience.
I think there are only two possible ways of answering these questions. 1) die and see what happens, or, as a less potentially terminal method, 2) study the nature of reality until we can deduce convincing theories which agree with everything we observe, which, if we obverse the existence of a universal identity,
will include a theory of that universal identity.
And discussions such as these can provide the starting points for the 2nd method.
Some would suggest a third method, that of truth-realisation, as mentioned by ethereal. But you take that path, how do you know that the "Truth" which you can't surrender isn't just another obstacle? As Iskander asked, how do you know the process of surrendering isn't simply building up another layer of illusion?
So, do we observe the existence of a universal identity? What is required for it to be observed by everyone? What qualities does it have? What evidence is there that those qualities can be attributed to a universal identity, and not to individual human nature?
Iskander, you asked Michael, "What if the 'universal' identity were a state of consciousness?" I'll give my opinion because, well, I like sticking my nose in.
If that were the case, since states of consciousness are variable, it would mean that an individual human could drop in and out of the universal identity whenever his/her state of consciousness differed from the particular state associated with universal identity. I suppose this is why universal identity is considered consciousness itself by some, rather than a particular state of consciousness. But being able to drop in and out of the universal consciousness would explain why no-one is truly aware of the universal consciousness until they experience that state.
But in either case, how would you show that consciousness, or a particular state, is more than simply a function of our physical brain, resulting from a vast array of neurological activity?
It can, and has, been demonstrated that particular states of consciousness can be induced by manipulation of neurological activity, and that particular states of consciousness are correlated with particular forms of neurological and physiological activity. It's therefore reasonable to conclude that consciousness is directly related to neurological activity, though that doesn't address the possibility of brain as a receiver for consciousness. Is there evidence to support a link between consciousness and universal identity?