Quote:
Originally Posted by InJoy  From another thread, this fascinating subject arose.
Does free will exist? Can the actions of people ever be accurately predicted 100% of the time? If there was enough computing power and underlying data, could we ever predict the future with accuracy? Do we have a choice about what we do, or is it predetermined? If free will does exist, is it limited to humans?
There are probably dozens more questions.
Let's start with the one Michael Chui asked me: Wordnet Princeton defines free will this way: the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies
It defines choice (in this context) as: the act of choosing or selecting
To me, free will is the ability to choose freely, even randomly, whenever I want. By this definition (if we can agree upon it) it is the opposite of determinism. In other words, the future is unpredictable. It would be impossible to predict with 100% accuracy what's going to happen tomorrow because people (at least) have the ability to change their minds and actions at will.
Anybody have a better definition? |
I don't think the fact of free will in itself entails we are inherently unpredictable. Obviously we can predict to a certain extent what people will do. We can predict that a poor person, on spotting a £50 note lying on the street, will pick it up and put it in his pocket. And the more and more we get to know a person, the more we will probably be able to predict his or her behaviour. We might imagine if we were to completely understand the essence of a person, understand everything that that person is, and we had an unlimited intelligence and knowledge of the environment, that we might be able to perfectly predict that person's behaviour. However that would not effect his free will one iota.
What does free will mean? I really want to know what determinism means. It seems to me that I'm the only person in the Universe who doesn't know what it means. But what free will means is much easier.
We tend to think of our behaviour as being a result of our desires and intentions. Thus for example, in waking up in the morning, I might have the choice of having either porridge, or eggs and bacon for breakfast. I am immediately aware of having the power to choose which to have. I might choose eggs and bacon because I prefer the taste. Or I might choose porridge, maybe not because I prefer the taste, but because I am concerned with my weight or health. But whatever I choose it seems for all the world that it is my choice, and it is ultimately my choice even though I might be heavily influenced in making one choice or the other. Thus I may have no problems with my health and weight, have no ethical problems with eating meat, and vastly prefer the taste of eggs and bacon. Therefore it would seem I have no reason to choose to eat porridge for breakfast and every reason to eat eggs and bacon instead. Yet, notwithstanding all of this, I nevertheless still appear to have the power to choose to eat porridge. This power to choose between alternatives is what we refer to as free will.
However, if we are to consider ourselves as being the same characteristic type of thing as any other physical thing or process, then, on the face of it, we have a difficulty here. We intuitively suppose that the vast preponderance of physical processes in the Universe are not accompanied by any conscious awareness. Thus for example, we tend to suppose that a boulder rolling down a hill, the planets which orbit the Sun and so on, unlike us, do not have accompanying mental experiences. Hence there is no question of such physical processes having any free will. It merely requires the application of physical laws to completely understand their behaviour. Take the example of the Earth orbiting the Sun. We suppose that the Sun’s gravitational field constrains the Earth to follow a circular path around the Sun. Indeed, in the absence of any other forces, we would consider it miraculous if it took any other path.
In contrast we appear to be in direct control of much of our behaviour. It might be extremely unusual indeed for me to make the choice to eat porridge for breakfast; indeed it might be unprecedented. But it would scarcely be considered to be miraculous! This underscores the notion that it seems that I am never compelled to behave or choose in a given manner. It seems I have the power to choose to eat porridge rather than eggs and bacon, even in the absence of any good reasons for so choosing, and even if inevitably I never do so. This power of choice (if it exists) is what is meant by free will.